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EXCLUSION OR DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FOR
THE CONVICTION OF FOREIGN CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE:
GRAND PROBLEMS WITH THE
PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act'
(INA) excludes all aliens who have committed crimes involving
moral turpitude from entry into the United States.2 The "petty
offense" exception, however, limits the applicability of the section by
enabling aliens who meet its requirements to avoid the reach of sec-
tion 212(a)(9) even though they have committed crimes involving
moral turpitude.3
The requirements of the petty offense exception are not clearly
discernable from the wording of the statute. This ambiguity has per-
mitted federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
to formulate three different interpretations of the section. This Note
explains the significance of the petty offense exception as it applies to
foreign convictions and evaluates the three different interpretations
of the exception in light of the language of the statute, the legislative
history, and the purposes of the INA. This Note then suggests an
amendment that would both resolve the present conflict over the cor-
rect interpretation of the exception and better reflect the substantive
policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
I. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, as
amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1503 (1976)). Section 212(a)(9) of the Act appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)
(1976), quotedat note 3 infra.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this chap-
ter, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded
from admission into the United States:. . . (9) Aliens who have been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.. .. "
3. The petty offense exception provides:
Any alien who would be excludable because of a conviction of a misdemeanor
classifiable as a petty offense under the provisions of section 1(3) of title 18, by
reason of the punishment actually imposed, or who would be excludable as one
who admits the commission of an offense that is classifiable as a misdemeanor
under the provisions of section 1(2) of title 18, by reason of the punishment
which might have been imposed upon him, may be granted a visa and admitted
to the United States if otherwise admissible: Provided, That the alien has com-
mitted only one such offense, or admits the commission of acts which constitute
the essential elements of only one such offense.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976).
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I
EFFECT OF THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Congress enacted the petty offense exception in 1954,4 and
amended and incorporated the exception into the Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1961.5 The petty offense exception prohibits the
Immigration and Naturalization Service from refusing or revoking a
visa of any alien who has committed a crime involving moral turpi-
tude if the alien meets the section's requirements.6 This prohibition
operates automatically; it is not left to the discretion of governmental
authorities.7
The petty offense exception also provides an alien with a
defense to a deportation action.8 18 U.S.C. § 1251(a) provides that
"[a]ny alien in the United States. . .shall. . . be deported who-
(1) at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens
excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry."9 An alien
meeting the requirements of the petty offense exception can thus
avoid deportation even though he has committed a crime involving
moral turpitude. The defense provided by the exception also enables
an alien to petition successfully for voluntary departure from the
United States. Voluntary departure, which "offers an alien several
advantages over a deportation decree," is not available to those
aliens who are "deportable" under section 1251.10
In sum, the petty offense exception can enable an alien to pre-
vent exclusion, defend against deportation, and successfully petition
for voluntary departure. Because the exception can have such a sig-
nificant impact on these areas of immigration law, judicial and
administrative interpretations of the statute are very important.
4. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-770, § 4, 68 Stat. 1145.
5. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 13, 75 Stat. 650.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976). The statute also covers aliens who have admitted
committing a crime involving moral turpitude but who have never been convicted. Id.
7. See In re Mendoza, 111. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (1965); In re H., 6 I. & N. Dec. 738,
738 (1955); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 2.43d(4), at 2-320 (rev. ed. 1980). This is true even though the statute provides that an
alien "may be granted a visa and admitted to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)
(1976) (emphasis added).
8. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 2.43d(4), at 2-320.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
10. Comment, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1021, 1024 (1976). Voluntary departure enables
the alien to re-enter the United States without the Attorney General's permission, 8
U.S.C. § 1326 (1976), and to choose his own destination upon leaving the UnitedMStates,
id. § 1253.
To determine whether an alien is deportable under § 1251, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(e),
1 l01(f)(3), 1182(a)(9) (1976); Khalaf v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 361 F.2d
208, 210 (7th Cir. 1966).
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II
CONSTRUING THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The petty offense exception provides that an alien who has com-
mitted a crime involving moral turpitude in a foreign country may
avoid deportation or exclusion if the crime is defined as a misde-
meanor and the punishment actually imposed did not exceed six
months imprisonment and/or a $500 fine." Problems of interpreta-
tion have arisen concerning the proper method of defining misde-
meanor. Although it is clear that federal law supplies the definitions
of misdemeanor and petty offense, 12 judicial and administrative
opinions do not agree on the correct application. The following dis-
cussion analyzes three different methods of applying the petty
offense exception.
A. THE "DOMESTIC ANALOGUE" APPROACH
Two United States Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Board of
Immigration Appeals have adopted the domestic analogue
approach.' 3 These courts construe the phrase "by reason of punish-
ment actually imposed" as only modifying "petty offense." There-
fore, whether the foreign crime is a misdemeanor or a felony does
not depend upon the punishment actually imposed. Rather, the defi-
nition depends on the maximum penalty that could be imposed were
the same or analogous crime committed in the United States. Since a
misdemeanor is defined as any offense not punishable by death or
prison term exceeding one year,14 if a crime comparable to the for-
eign offense is punishable in the United States by imprisonment for
11. See note 3 supra and note 12 infra.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary:
(1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year is a felony.
(2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor.
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for
a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense.
In Barde v. United States, 224 F.2d 959, 959 (6th Cir. 1955) and Cartwright v. United
States, 146 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1944), the courts held that the maximum punishment
provided by statute determines whether an offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.
13. See Soetarto v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 778, 780-81 (7th
Cir. 1975); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Marino, I. &
N. Interim Dec. No. 2377 (April 30, 1975); In re Katsanis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 266, 269
(1973); In re Medina-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 7, 9 (1962); In re M., 8 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454
(1959); In re T., 8 1. & N. Dec. 4,5 (1956). InIn re T., 6 1. & N. Dec. 508, 516 (1955), the
BIA at first rejected the domestic analogue approach in favor of the foreign maximum
approach. See note 44 infra and accompanying text. That decision was immediately
reversed by the Attorney General. 6 I. & N. Dec. at 516-17. Since then, the BIA has
consistently followed the domestic analogue approach.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 12 supra.
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more than one year, that offense is a felony and the alien is outside
the scope of the exception.
The domestic analogue approach requires a two-tier analysis.
First, a court must "translate" the foreign crime into a comparable
violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. If the U.S. Code contains no
analogous provision, courts look to Title 22 of the District of Colum-
bia Code.' 5 The maximum American penalty for the crime deter-
mines whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony. Second, if the crime
is a misdemeanor, the court looks to the "punishment actually
imposed" upon the alien to determine whether the misdemeanor is a
petty offense. 16 If the alien was sentenced to less than six months in
prison, paid a fine of not more than $500, or both, the petty offense
exception applies.
The domestic analogue approach has several advantages. By
using the U.S. or D.C. penal code 17 to determine the maximum pen-
alty for a crime committed in a foreign country, this approach avoids
"divergent and anomalous results [that] would follow from [the]
application of varying systems of foreign law."' 8 The classification
of a crime as a misdemeanor or felony will not depend upon which
nation's criminal laws the alien violated.
This alternative also reflects important policies underlying U.S.
immigration laws. The primary purpose of exclusion and deporta-
tion statutes is to keep out "undesirables."' 19 Arguably, an "undesir-
able" is any person who has acted contrary to U.S. societal
standards.20 Because the domestic analogue approach uses compa-
15. The D.C. Code applies because it is considered to be a manifestation of Con-
gress's view of non-federal criminal offenses. See Soetarto v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 516 F.2d 778, 780-81 (7th Cir. 1975); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 287
(3d Cir. 1962).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976). See note 3 supra.
17. Courts will not examine the D.C. criminal laws, however, unless there are no
comparable provisions in the U.S. Code. In re Katsanis, 14 1. & N. Dec. 266, 269 (1973);
In re T., 8 I. & N. Dec. 4, 5 (1956); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7,
§ 2.43d(4), at 2-321. Therefore, while authorizing the use of two Codes, this approach
actually applies a single standard, since a conflict between the two will never result.
18. Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 1962). Giammarlo involved a
deportation proceeding against an alien who was convicted of larceny in Australia. Since
the crime would have been a felony in the United States, the court affirmed a BIA depor-
tation order even though the penalty actually imposed was a fine of less than $500.
19. In Comment, supra note 10, the author states that "[tihe theory of deportation
[and exclusion] is that aliens failing to comply with established rules of conduct simply
do not qualify for residence in this country .... [D]eportation ... is merely a device to
protect Americans from undesirable persons." Id. at 1023. See also Knoetze v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 201, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("The obvious Congressional purpose of
subsection 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is to keep persons who are
likely to be undesirable residents or sojourners from being in our midst.").
20. This characterization of "undesirable" as defied by U.S. standards draws sup-
port from the fact that the term "moral turpitude" in section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act is defined by the "moral standards generally prevailing in the
PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
rable American crimes to define misdemeanors, courts evaluate the
conduct of aliens, wherever exhibited, by U.S. standards. Therefore,
even if a foreign country considers a particular crime a minor
offense, the petty offense exception would not apply if the compara-
ble U.S. crime was considered sufficiently egregious to be character-
ized as a felony.2'
Finally, the legislative history of the exception seems to support
this interpretation. Unfortunately, because Congress adopted the
section as a "floor" amendment, the available legislative history is
minimal.22 After the House of Representatives passed the amend-
ment, Representative Walter, the sponsor of the bill in the House,
sent a letter to Senator McCarran, the Senate sponsor. Senator
McCarran read the letter into the Congressional Record before the
Senate vote on the amendment. The correspondence stated:
I want to say for the record and as part of the legislative history of the bill,
that my amendment... adopted by the House today, is intended to require
the meeting of two standards, namely, the offense must be an offense which #'
committed in the United States would be a misdemeanor (not punishable by
imprisonment for I year or more), and, second, the offense must be one for
which the actual penalty imposed in the particular case was imprisonment
not to exceed 6 months or a fine not to exceed $500, or both.23
A contemporaneous administrative interpretation of the petty
offense exception provides further support for the domestic analogue
approach. Soon after the enactment of the petty offense exception,
the State Department promulgated regulations construing it to
require the application of the domestic analogue approach.24
United States." 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.91(a)(9)(i), 42.91(a)(9)(i) (1980). See United States ex
rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546, 548 (5th Cir. 1952); In re Katsanis, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 266, 268 (1973); 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 95, 96 (1937). For a general discussion of the
interpretation of "moral turpitude" in deportation hearings, see Annot., 23 A.L.R. Fed.
480 (1975).
21. For example, even if the theft of $110 in a foreign nation carries a maximum
penalty in that country that meets the federal definition of misdemeanor (imprisonment
for less than one year), the convicted alien could not use the petty offense exception
because the District of Columbia Code imposes a maximum penalty that meets the fed-
eral definition of a felony (more than one year). See 22 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2201
(1973); 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962).
22. The House of Representatives' brief comments on the exception are recorded at
100 CONG. REc. 15,490-92 (1954). The amendment's legislative history in the Senate can
be found at 100 CONG. REc. 15,388 (1954).
23. Id at 15,388 (emphasis added). Further, when introducing the amendment to
the Senate, the Senate sponsor stated that "the construction placed on the amendment by
... Representative Walter, is in complete accord with my own construction." Id
24. 22 C.F.R. § 42.42(c)(1) (1955) provided:
An alien shall not be ineligible to receive a visa under the provisions of section
212(a)(9) of the act (i) solely by reason of the conviction of a single offense
which, f committed in the United States, would be a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment not to exceed one year, and for which the penalty actually
imposed was imprisonment not to exceed six months or a fine not to exceed $500,
or both, or (ii) solely by reason of the admission of the commission of a single
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Although these regulations no longer appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations,25 the Immigration and Naturalization Service has con-
sistently applied the domestic analogue approach in an adjudicatory
context since 1955.26 Where a statutory provision is ambiguous and
an administrative agency charged with applying and enforcing the
statute adopts a certain interpretation contemporaneously with the
statute's enactment, it is a rule of statutory construction that courts
should give substantial weight to that interpretation. 27 This is partic-
ularly true where this administrative construction occurs in an adju-
dicatory context,2 8 and has been followed for a long period of time.2 9
The State Department's contemporaneous construction and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's continued application of
the domestic analogue approach strongly suggest that courts should
defer to this interpretation.
Although practical considerations, policy arguments, legislative
history, and rules of statutory construction support the adoption of
the domestic analogue approach, there are a number of flaws. First,
the two appellate courts that have adopted it and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals apply a different construction to crimes committed
by aliens within the United States than they do to crimes committed
abroad. Where aliens are convicted under state laws, the state con-
offense which, !f committed in the United States, would be a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by imprisonment not to exceed one year.
(emphasis added).
25. This interpretation last appeared at 22 C.F.R. § 42.42 (a)(9) (1958). In 1959, the
State Department re-numbered and amended the visa regulations. Reference to the petty
offense exception was omitted. The present "moral turpitude" regulations are now codi-
fied in 22 C.F.R. § 41.91(a)(9) (1980).
26. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
27. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sumner Financial Corp., 451 F.2d 898, 902 (5th
Cir. 1971), the court stated:
In construing this statute we feel it is proper to show great deference to the inter-
pretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administra-
tion .... Deference is particularly appropriate where the administrative
practice at stake involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of mak-
ing the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new
.... The construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.
See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). This deference is particu-
larly warranted if Congress subsequently re-enacts the provision at issue without sub-
stantial change. See Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1936). See
generaly E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 388-98 (1940).
28. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789-90 (2d Cir.)
(Hand, J.), af'd, 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946).
29. Stanley Co. of America v. Tobriner, 298 F.2d 318, 320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1961); E.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 393-94. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's
long-standing application of the domestic analogue approach in adversarial proceedings
meets this test, even though the original administrative interpretation occurred in a legis-
lative context, and no longer appears in the C.F.R. See note 25 supra and accompanying
text.
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viction is not "translated" into a comparable federal or D.C. crime.
Instead, the maximum penalty that the state statute imposes deter-
mines whether the crime is a misdemeanor or felony. 30 This incon-
sistent application of the exception leads to "divergent and
anomalous results"31 because different states will impose different
penalties for the same crime.32 Thus, the domestic analogue
approach, which translates foreign crimes into federal or D.C. crimes
to avoid divergent results, produces inconsistencies when applied to
state convictions.
Second, the policy consideration of keeping out "undesirables"
suggests that courts should use the maximumforeign penalty to
determine whether the crime is a misdemeanor or a felony. If an
"undesirable" is one who is "bad" by U.S. standards, then the
domestic analogue approach is appropriate. If, however, Congress
enacted the immigration barriers to prevent the admission of persons
who manifest antisocial behavior, then foreign penalties are better
indicators of such behavior.33 Foreign laws reflect the social mores
of the country in which the alien committed the crime; a grave viola-
tion of a country's custom that is sanctioned by a severe penalty
might not be considered so offensive by U.S. standards. It is possible
that the foreign penalty could greatly exceed one year's imprison-
ment while the comparable U.S. statute would simply impose a
nominal fine.34
30. See In re Mendoza, 11I. & N. Dec. 239, 240-41 (1965); In re C.O., 8 I. & N. Dec.
488, 490-91 (1959).
31. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
32. For example, compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 , § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980)
(conviction for selling less than 2.5 grams of marijuana to a minor punishable by not
more than 1 year imprisonment and a fine of not more than $500) (misdemeanor under
federal law) with CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West Supp. 1980) (convic-
tion for selling marijuana to a minor punishable by imprisonment for 3, 4 or 5 years)
(felony under federal law).
33. This argument is based on the premise that a person who violated his own coun-
try's laws would be more likely to exhibit antisocial behavior in the United States, even
though the original criminal act might not have been "antisocial" by U.S. standards. See
note 19 supra and accompanying text.
34. For example, Iranian law imposes the death penalty or 15 years imprisonment
for the conviction of hoarding consumer goods, such as food. See N.Y. Times, May 15,
1974, at 7, col. I. Under the domestic analogue approach, a conviction for this crime
would not be a felony because neither the United States nor the District of Columbia
proscribes similar conduct. Therefore, an Iranian who hoarded food and thereby exhib-
ited a strong disregard for the mores of his society would not have committed a felony for
the purposes of the petty offense exception.
It should be noted that the petty offense exception would not apply if the punishment
actually imposed exceeded six months. A convicted Iranian food hoarder would prob-
ably be ineligible. See notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text. In addition, the excep-
tion only comes into play when an alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. See note 2 supra. Although U.S. law does not prohibit the type of activity
punished by the Iranian law, the Iranian crime is arguably one that involves moral turpi-
tude. Of course, whether particular conduct is morally turpitudinous depends on U.S.
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Although the maximum foreign penalty is a better indicator of
antisocial behavior than is the maximum U.S. penalty, the domestic
analogue approach does consider the foreign nation's societal stand-
ards. It monitors antisocial behavior by using the "punishment actu-
ally imposed" by the foreign country to define "petty offense." In
cases where the alien's behavior so offended the mores of the con-
victing country as to require imprisonment for more than six months
or a fine of more than $500, 35 the exception will not be available to
the alien, even though the comparable federal statute classifies the
crime as a misdemeanor. 36
Third, although representative Walter's letter37 corroborates the
domestic analogue approach, this evidence may not be a strong indi-
cator of legislative intent.38 Because the House sponsor did not out-
line his interpretation of the exception until after the House passed
the legislation,39 the letter is clearly not a valid indication of the
intent of the House of Representatives.40
social standards. The absence of legal sanctions probably indicates that food hoarding is
not morally reprehensible in the United States. See note 20 supra.
35. See notes 3 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
36. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, § 2.43d(4), at 2-322 ("If the sen-
tence actually imposed exceeded six months, the [petty offense] exemption is unavailable,
even though a lesser sentence might have been imposed upon a comparable conviction in
American courts."). See In re Scarpulla, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2332 (Nov. 21, 1974);
In re M., 8 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454-55 (1959).
In the Iranian food hoarding situation, the petty offense exception would be unavail-
able if the Iranian petitioner was sentenced to more than six months in prison. See note
34 supra.
37. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
38. "[T]he weight of authority apparently refuses to regard the opinions, the motives,
and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature, even in debate,
as a proper source from which to ascertain the meaning of an enactment." E. CRAW-
FORD, supra note 27, at 375-76.
On the other hand, an opposing view suggests that the statements of a bill's sponsor
should be accorded at least some weight.
In the course of deliberations on a bill, legislators look to its sponsor as well as
to the representative of the committee having charge of it, as one who is expected
to be particularly well informed about its purpose, meaning, and intended effect.
In recognition of this reality of legislative practice, courts give consideration to
statements made by a bill's sponsor on grounds similar to those relied on to sup-
port the use of statements by the committeeman in charge of the bill.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.15, at 221-22 (4th
rev. ed. C. Sands 1974).
39. When Representative Walter introduced the "floor" amendment in the House, he
made no reference to the interpretation later expressed in his letter to Senator McCarran.
Rather, his statements indicate that his main concern was that the federal definitions of
misdemeanor, felony, and petty offense be applied to the exception. See 100 CONG. REC.
15,491 (1954) ("The purpose of my amendment is to ... clarify [§ 212(a)(9)] ... so as to
bring it in conformity with section 1 of title 18, United States Code. .. ").
40. In N.C. Freed Co., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held that a letter written by a sponsor of a bill one year
after the enactment of the legislation "does not constitute part of legislative history and is
entitled to no weight ... ." Id at 1217 n.23.
PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
A final problem with the domestic analogue approach is that
many foreign crimes do not have comparable American counter-
parts. Thus, courts sometimes have difficulty translating a foreign
crime into the proper federal or District of Columbia statute. For
example, in Knoetze v. United States,41 a South African court had
convicted the petitioner of "obstruction of justice." The court noted
that the comparable federal statute, "Chapter 73 on obstruction of
justice in U.S.C., Title 18 has eleven sections, five of which are mis-
demeanors ... and the rest are felonies."' 42 Indeed, numerous
experts on South African law could not agree on whether the crime,
if committed in the United States, would have been a misdemeanor
or a felony.43 To the extent that foreign convictions do not easily
translate into federal or District of Columbia crimes, the initial fact-
finder has great discretion in deciding whether the crime is a misde-
meanor or a felony.
B. THE "FOREIGN MAXIMUM" APPROACH
A second interpretation of the petty offense exception also
requires a two-tier analysis. Like the domestic analogue approach,
the foreign maximum approach assumes that the phrase "by reason
of punishment actually imposed" modifies only the term "petty
offense." Unlike the previous interpretation, however, this construc-
tion looks to the maximum penalty that the convictingforeign coun-
try imposes on the violation to determine if the crime is a
misdemeanor.44 The second tier, like that of the domestic analogue
approach, examines the punishment actually imposed to determine
whether the misdemeanor is a petty offense.
41. 472 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1979). For an outline of the facts involved in the
Knoetze case, see note 60 infra.
42. Id at 211.
43. I, at 207-08.
.44. The Board of Immigration Appeals developed and adopted the foreign maxi-
mum approach in a case that was subsequently reversed by the Attorney General. See In
re T., 6 1. & N. Dec. 508 (May 6, 1955), reversed by the Attorney General, id at 516-17
(July 19, 1955). See note 13 supra. There, a Canadian court convicted the alien of steal-
ing $32.60. Although the crime would have been a misdemeanor if committed in the
District of Columbia, the maximum Canadian penalty was seven years' imprisonment.
The BIA therefore characterized the crime as a felony.
[,V]e hold that the determination of whether a foreign crime is a felony or misde-
meanor must be made by looking to the punishment prescribed by the law of
that country for the particular crime and using the standard set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1. In other words, if a foreign offense is punishable by death or imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year, it is a felony and otherwise it is a misde-
meanor. If the offense is a misdemeanor and the punishment actually imposed
does not exceed [6 months imprisonment and/or $500 fine], the crime is a petty
offense.
Id at 516. The BIA has since consistently adopted the domestic analogue approach. See
decisions cited in note 13 supra.
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This interpretation eliminates a number of problems inherent in
the domestic analogue approach. First, the treatment of foreign
crimes under the foreign maximum approach is consistent with the
treatment of crimes committed by aliens in the United States.45 In
the case of both foreign and domestic convictions, the maximum
penalty imposed by the offended sovereign is "plugged into" the fed-
eral one-year misdemeanor limit.
Second, the foreign maximum approach eliminates the problem
of "translating" foreign crimes into American statutes.4 6 Third, as
previously discussed, this interpretation of the exception better
reflects the policy of preventing the immigration of aliens who
exhibit antisocial behavior in their own country.47
Although the amendment's legislative history supports the
domestic analogue approach,48 that interpretation does not inevita-
bly follow from the language of the statute. The subsequently
vacated BIA decision that originally adopted this interpretation con-
cluded that the wording of the statute clearly indicated that the for-
eign maximum approach was the only correct interpretation and that
resort to the exception's legislative history was improper. 49 The
Board stated "that the language of the statute is plain and that there
can be no justification for an attempt to add to its words importing
the fiction that a crime committed in a foreign country was actually
committed in the United States."'50
Like the domestic analogue approach, the foreign maximum
approach has several flaws. Although the foreign maximum
approach may guard against the admission of aliens who have
exhibited antisocial behavior (as defined by the convicting coun-
try),5 ' it does not measure the alien's conduct by American stand-
45. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
46. The BIA recognized this flaw in the domestic analogue approach, stating that
such an interpretation of the exception "could not be rationalized, under any circum-
stances, unless the foreign crime and the United States crime were identical." In re T., 6
I. & N. Dec. 508, 514-15 (1955). See also notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. For example, under the foreign maxi-
mum approach, the Iranian who hoarded food, disregarding the customs and laws of his
nation, would not be able to use the petty offense exception since the crime is now char-
acterized as a felony. Of course, this argument assumes that "antisocial behavior" is
accurately measured by the customs and traditions of the alien's country. What consti-
tutes antisocial behavior by U.S. standards plays no role. See notes 51-52 infra and
accompanying text.
48. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 37-40 supra and
accompanying text.
49. In re T., 6 I. & N. Dec. 508 (1955). The Board, citing Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917), concluded that" '[w]here the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are
to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."' 6 I. & N. Dec. at 515.
50. Id
51. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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ards. Under this approach, an alien convicted of a crime that would
be a felony if committed in the United States might still be granted
entry into this country if the convicting country considered the crime
to be relatively trivial.5 2 Conversely, the conviction of a minor
offense by U.S. standards would bar entry if the convicting country
punished the crime by more than one year's imprisonment.5 3 Also,
because the foreign maximum approach uses a foreign standard, it
runs contrary to the judicially adopted position that refuses to recog-
nize the effect offoreign pardons in deportation proceedings.5 4
The foreign maximum approach is probably overbroad in guar-
anteeing the exclusion of "antisocial" aliens. If an alien has lived in
the nation where he was convicted of a criminal offense, the foreign
maximum approach effectively monitors conduct violating that
country's social norms. When an alien commits a crime in a country
other than his own, however, that country's criminal laws may not be
an accurate indicator of antisocial behavior if the offender was not in
the country long enough to appreciate its societal norms.5 5 Finally,
the foreign maximum approach will lead to divergent and anoma-
52. For example, a foreign country might not consider violations of its drug laws to
be serious crimes. If, for example, the crime of selling heroin in Pakistan was punishable
by imprisonment for less than one year and the convicted alien received a three month
prison sentence, he would be eligible for entry into the United States under the foreign
maximum approach to the petty offense exception, even though the same offense would
be a felony if committed in the United States.
53. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. In Knoetze v. United States, 472 F.
Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1979), the court recognized the problem of completely ignoring what
is "bad" by U.S. standards.
[I]t is most disturbing to consider that the harsh penalties of revocation and
deportation, even under a non-immigrant visa, can be visited upon someone for
a proceeding against that person in a country that (I) makes no distinctions
between felonies and misdemeanors, as in American law; (2) considered it a len-
ient matter and thereby equivalent to a misdemeanor under American law; and
(3) the facts as testified to. . . left the court convinced it is unlikely that a United
States Attorney would take the matter to a grand jury or prosecute on a felony
basis in America ....
Id at 209-10 n.ll.
54. See, e.g., Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122, 125 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 611
(1938); Weedin v. Hempel, 28 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1928); United States ex rel
Palermo v. Smith, 17 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1927); In re B., 7 I. & N. Dec. 166, 167
(1956); In re G., 5 I. & N. Dec. 129, 132-33 (1953).
The "pardon exception" provides that an alien who has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude shall not be deported if he has "subsequent to such conviction
been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by
the Governor of any of the several States. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976) (emphasis
added).
In addition to the treatment of foreign pardons, the application of American standards
to define "moral turpitude" cuts against the adoption of the foreign maximum approach.
See note 20 supra.
55. In the case of food hoarding in Iran, for example, an individual from Italy con-
victed of hoarding food duriig a short visit to Iran would not fall within the petty offense
exception under the foreign maximum approach because the crime would still be consid-
ered a felony.
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lous results because different nations may have different maximum
penalties for the same crime.56
C. THE "ACTUAL PUNISHMENT" APPROACH
The final interpretation of the petty offense exception maintains
that the statutory phrase "by reason of the punishment actually
imposed" modifies both "petty offense" and "misdemeanor." Under
this interpretation, "the only significant element for the purposes of
applying the exception is the duration or term of punishment actu-
ally imposed.157 Under the actual punishment approach, the excep-
tion is available to an alien if the penalty imposed is a sentence of six
months or less and/or a fine of $500 or less, regardless of the maxi-
mum authorized penalty.5 8 This approach has been adopted by the
Ninth Circuit59 and in dicta by the Southern District of Florida.60
The actual punishment approach has several advantages over
the first two interpretations. By using a single standard, this con-
struction of section 212(a)(9) eliminates the possibility of "divergent
and anomalous results" when applying the exception to both for-
eign 6 and domestic62 criminal convictions. In Patel v. Immigration
56. This is the main criticism of the foreign maximum approach espoused by the
proponents of the domestic analogue approach. See notes 17-18 & 52 supra and accom-
panying text.
57. Patel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 542 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original).
58. This penalty meets the requirements of the federal definition of a petty offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976). See note 12 supra and accompanying text. If the punishment
imposed meets the definition of a petty offense, it will a fortiori meet the requirements of
a misdemeanor, since all petty offenses are misdemeanors. Id
59. Patel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 542 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976). Patel
involved an appeal from a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service order refusing
plaintifi's petition for voluntary departure. The plaintiff, an Indian native, had been con-
victed of receiving stolen property under a California statute. Although the case dealt
with a domestic conviction, the court implied that its interpretation of the petty offense
exception should be applied to foreign convictions as well. Id at 798.
Even though Patel specifically rejected the domestic analogue approach as applied in
Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962), and Soetarto v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 516 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1975), it did not fully comprehend the interpreta-
tion formulated by those cases. In a footnote, the court stated that "[wle do not accept
the rule first applied in Giammario v. Hurney . .. and adopted in Soetarto v. United
States, [sic] ... that 'actual punishment' is determined by looking to the maximum pos-
sible penalty which could be imposed under an equivalent federal statute." 542 F.2d at
798 n.5.
60. Knoetze v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In Knoetze, a pro-
fessional boxer and a citizen of South Africa sought to enjoin the U.S. Secretary of State
from revoking his visa. The crime at issue was a South African conviction for obstruc-
tion ofjustice. Although the court approved the approach taken in Patel instead of the
domestic analogue approach, it decided the case on other grounds.
61. This is a criticism of the foreign maximum approach. See note 56 supra and
accompanying text.
62. This is a problem inherent in the domestic analogue approach. See notes 30-31
supra and accompanying text.
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& Naturalization Service, 63 the Ninth Circuit stressed the advantages
of looking to the punishment actually imposed instead of the statu-
tory maximum penalty in defining misdemeanor. The court stated
that "[n]o other basis would be equitable or reasonable. States vary
considerably in their classification of crimes, as do foreign
nations. ' 64 Moreover, this interpretation, like the foreign maximum
approach, eliminates the problem of translating the foreign convic-
tion into a comparable violation of the U.S. or D.C. criminal code.6 5
Compared to the first two interpretations, the actual punishment
approach is arguably more concerned with the alien's culpability.
Since courts will take mitigating factors into consideration when
determining the length of the sentence, the punishment actually
imposed better reflects the egregiousness of the defendant's actions
than does the maximum penalty established for an entire class of
crimes. In addition, the actual punishment approach is probably
more effective in measuring antisocial behavior. One of the mitigat-
ing factors that a court will probably consider is the extent to which
the defendant perceived and acted in contravention of societal
mores. Through his discretion in imposing a sentence, the judge
might hold a foreigner to a more lenient standard than he would a
native who is presumably fully aware of the consequences of his
actions.66
The actual punishment approach does not follow from the lan-
guage of the exception;67 it is a judicial attempt to construe the stat-
ute to achieve equitable results. The district court in Knoetze v.
United States68 acknowledged that the actual punishment approach
was a strained interpretation of the exception, but supported the
approach by stressing fairness considerations. The court stated that
63. 542 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. Id at 798.
65. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
66. Returning to the food hoarding situation, an Iranian judge would probably
impose only a nominal fine on the Italian who, not realizing the seriousness of his
actions, hoarded food during his short stay in Iran. Under the foreign maximum
approach, the alien would not be able to use the petty offense exception even though he
exhibited minimal antisocial behavior. The maximum Iranian penalty imposable for the
conviction makes the crime a felony. Therefore, the foreign maximum approach's first
level of analysis would prevent the alien from using the exception. Since the actual pun-
ishment approach looks solely to the penalty imposed, the alien would fall within the
exception if the sentence was less than six months in prison.
On the other hand, neither the domestic analogue nor the foreign maximum approach
totally disregards the effect of mitigating circumstances. Both interpretations examine
the actual punishment in their second-tier of analysis. Mitigating factors thereby become
relevant, but both approaches subordinate the trial court's discretion to the inflexible
mandate of the legislature.
67. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
68. 472 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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"although Congress has plenary power in the area of deportation 69
Congress must be presumed to expect courts to consider equitable
matters rather than reflexively applying rigid tests . . . and it is set-
tled doctrine70 that deportation statutes must be construed in favor
of the alien." 7
1
The biggest problem with this third interpretation is its inconsis-
tency with the language of the statute. Under basic rules of gram-
matical construction, the phrase "by reason of the punishment
actually imposed" only modifies "petty offense" and not the word
"misdemeanor." It is a rule of statutory construction that the legisla-
ture is presumed to know the rules of grammar and to have drafted
according to such rules.72 A second rule of statutory construction
(which echoes the rules of grammar) maintains that qualifying
clauses in statutes modify the next preceding antecedent. 73 Under
this rule, the phrase "by reason of the punishment actually imposed"
modifies only the term "petty offense" and not "misdemeanor. 74
Further, since all petty offenses are misdemeanors, 75 if Congress
had intended the "punishment actually imposed" standard to define
both terms, it would not have included the word "misdemeanor" in
the exception. If the punishment actually imposed indicates that the
conviction is a petty offense, it will also indicate that the conviction
was a misdemeanor. By rendering the term "misdemeanor" super-
69. The U.S. Supreme Court underscored Congress's plenary power in the area of
deportation and visa issuances in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are pecu-
liarly concerned with the political conduct of government .... [Tihat the for-
mulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about
as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as
any aspect of our government.
Id at 531.
70. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966);
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948).
71. Knoetze v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 201, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (footnotes
added). The court also stated that "[r]arely has a court looked at the problem and con-
cluded that Congress would not want the court to impose the harsh consequences of
deportation by strict interpretation." Id
72. Since one may assume that the legislature knew and understood the rules of
grammar, such rules should be considered by the courts in their efforts to ascer-
tain the meaning of a statutory enactment, on the theory that they will reveal or
tend to reveal the correct sense or meaning thereof .... [The rules of grammar
may be] disregarded, modified, or extended where a strict adherence to them
would operate to defeat the obvious intention of the lawmakers....
E. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 337-38 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
73. Id at 331. See also J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION 349 (1891) ("Relative and qualifying words and phrases, grammatically and legally,
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.").
74. See note 3 supra for the text of the petty offense exception.
75. Petty offenses are a subset of misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976). See note
12 supra and accompanying text.
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fluous, the actual punishment approach violates another rule of stat-
utory 'construction reddendo singula singulis.76 Further, although
courts may interpret ambiguous immigration legislation to the bene-
fit of the alien,77 they may not judicially legislate where Congress has
plenary power.78
Finally, it is not clear that the actual punishment approach is
more equitable than the other interpretations of the exception. Just
as treatment of the same crime differs from country to country, dif-
ferent courts will treat convicted criminals differently when sentenc-
ing. Invariably, some judges will be more lenient or severe than
others. The actual punishment approach determines when to revoke
or refuse a visa and when to deport solely by the discretionary
actions of a particular court. Thus, this interpretation ignores the
legislatie characterization of the crime. By subjecting deportation
or revocation determinations to the sometimes fair, sometimes
vindictive discretion of the trial court, and by removing from consid-
eration the legislative judgment of the seriousness of the crime (as
reflected in the maximum sentence), the actual punishment approach
suffers from claims of unfairness as well.
III
RECOMMENDATION
Because each interpretation of the petty offense exception has
serious flaws, Congress should enact new legislation to amend the
exception. The amendment proposed below outlines precisely the
steps that a court or the BIA should follow, thereby eliminating the
need to construe the exception.
This proposed amendment to the petty offense exception
requires a three-tier analysis. An alien convicted of a crime in a for-
eign country may use the exception if: (1) the maximum penalty for
the crime imposed by the foreign country is three years imprison-
ment or less; 79 (2) the comparable federal or District of Columbia
criminal statute imposes a maximum penalty of one year or less; and
76. Under this principle, "words in different parts of a statute must be referred to
their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if
possible, rendering none of them useless or supeiftuous . E. CRAWFORD, supra note
27, at 332 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
77. See cases cited in note 70 supra.
78. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
79. The amendment uses the foreign maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment,
instead of one year, in order to broaden the scope of the proposed amendment. Since it
will probably be more difficult for aliens to use the proposal's three-tier analysis than any
of the present interpretations, a one year foreign "cut-off' point seems excessively restric-
tive.
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(3) the punishment actually imposed does not exceed six months
imprisonment and/or a $500 fine.
Although all three tiers of the proposed amendment would
apply in most circumstances, Congress should also provide an ave-
nue for a convicted alien to bypass one or two of the above listed
criteria if certain facts are present. Therefore, the recommended leg-
islation authorizes a court or the BIA to ignore the second require-
ment, the translation of the foreign crime into a U.S. statute, if it
determines that no federal or D.C. criminal offense closely parallels
the foreign conviction. Such flexibility alleviates the problem of
translating foreign crimes into American statutes 80 when crimes can-
not be effectively translated. 8'
The proposal would also permit a court or the BIA to disregard
the first requirement, the use of the maximum foreign penalty, if it
determines that the alien did not know or have reason to know that
his action was a serious violation of the country's laws and mores. If
the alien was present in the foreign country for at least six months
within the five-year period immediately preceding his commission of
the crime, the court or BIA may conclusively presume that the viola-
tor appreciated that country's social mores and had reason to know
that his conduct was a serious violation. This exception to the three-
tier analysis prevents the foreign maximum penalty from operating
as an inaccurate indicator of antisocial behavior.8 2
By considering the maximum penalties imposed by both the for-
eign country and the United States, the three-tier approach elimi-
nates other flaws inherent in the three present interpretations of the
petty offense exception. Because the proposal uses the maximum
penalties imposed by comparable offenses in the United States, it
measures the seriousness of the alien's acts by U.S. standards.83 By
considering the maximum foreign penalty, the amendment also
measures the degree of the alien's antisocial behavior, as defined by
the convicting country.84 Finally, the proposal rejects exclusive reli-
ance upon the decisions of particular judges, avoiding the flaws of
the actual punishment approach. The amendment also subjects state
convictions to the second and third requirements, thereby eliminat-
80. See generally notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
8 1. Where no American counterpart exists for a foreign crime, the act proscribed by
the foreign criminal law is probably not repugnant by U.S. standards. Therefore, a court
should only examine the degree of a defendant's antisocial behavior, as reflected by the
maximum foreign penalty and the punishment actually imposed.
82. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
83. This flaw is inherent in the foreign maximum approach. See note 52 supra and
accompanying text.
84. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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The petty offense exception can prohibit the rejection or revoca-
tion of a visa, provide an affirmative defense to a deportation action,
or facilitiate a voluntary departure. Courts and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals have formulated various interpretations of the stat-
ute, each having benefits as well as inherent defects. Because the
exception significantly affects various areas of immigration law,
Congress should amend the petty offense exception along the lines
suggested by this Note to eliminate the flaws in the various interpre-
tations and provide a uniform system of application.
Ralph Anthony Biagio Saggiomo I1.
85. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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